Attacking HTML5



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
Agenda

- Introduction to HTML5
- Attacking HTML5





Introduction to HTML5





Tags and Attributes

- Element tags (canvas, video)
- SEO tags (author, footer)
- Attributes (autofocus, required)
- CSS3 (selectors, 3D)

Integration features

- Geolocation
- Drag & Drop files



Session Storage

	Cookie	Session Storage
Maximum size	* 4 KB	Some MB
Content sent	With any request	Not sent
Can be accessed from	Any window	Only the same window
Deleted after	Fixed time	Always when window closed
Range	Per directory	Whole site
HttpOnly Flag	Yes	No

^{*} IE8 supports up to 10kb



Local Storage vs. Session Storage

	Session storage	Local storage
Maximum size	5 MB	10-15 MB
Can be accessed from	Only the same window	Any window
Deleted when	Window is closed	Not deleted

Local Storage ~ AKA Global Storage



SQL Storage

- SQLite
 - Standard SQL

- IndexedDB
 - Object Oriented



Cross Origin Resource Sharing

- The old methods:
 - ><iframe src="http://site.com/home.htm"></iframe>
 - ➤ Stupid block
 - <script src="http://site.com/home.js"></script>
 - You run the script from another domain on your site!
- The new method:
 - ► AJAX with Cross Origin Policy
 - ➤ You have full control on the data and the combination with your site



Cross Document Messaging

Send messages between the main page and the iframes.

Web Sockets


Open sockets and connections.

Web Workers

Execute JS code under another thread.



Attacking HTML5





Storage attacks – Stealing Data

- Goal
 - Get Sensitive Data
 - User Tracking

- Technique
 - An XSS anywhere in the application can be used to draw the data from site after the use.
 - User leaves the computer after browsing to another site.



Storage attacks – Stealing Data

- Vulnerabilities
 - No HTTPONLY Flag
 - No expiration date
 - No directory separation
 - Cross directory attack
 - Cross port attack (Chrome is protected)



Storage attacks – Dump data

- Old XSS exploit
 <script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
- New XSS exploit
 <script>alert(window.localStorage.key)</script>



Storage attacks – Dump data

Get values

```
var ss = "";
for(i in window.sessionStorage)
ss += i + " ";
```

Get names & values

```
var ss = "";
for(i = 0; i < window.sessionStorage.length; i++)
    ss += window.sessionStorage.key(i) + ":" +
sessionStorage.getItem(sessionStorage.key(i)) + " ";</pre>
```



Storage attacks - Spoofing data

- Goal
 - CSRF
 - Denial of Service (data parsing crash)
 - Stored XSS
- Technique
 - URL parameter can be simply spoofed
 - http://localhost:81/html5/storage/url-xss.htm?username=david
 - Local event can spoof by click jacking
 - XSS somewhere in the application



SQL Storage attacks - Spoofing

- SQL Injection
 - Tweets updater:

https://www.andlabs.org/html5/csSQLi.html

- Persistent XSS by SQL (XSSQLI)
 - No input validation, no output encoding https://www.andlabs.org/html5/csXSSI.html
 - Input validation without Output encoding https://www.andlabs.org/html5/csXSS2.html



SQL Storage attacks - Dump data

Get objects (connected to the DB)

```
var db = "";
for(i in window)
    if(window[i] == "[object Database]")
        db += i + "";
```

• Get tables:

SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'



Storage attacks – Demo

https://www.andlabs.org/html5/csSQLi.html

http://localhost:81/html5/storage/draw.js

document.write("<script
src='http://localhost:81/html5/storage/draw.js'></script>");



Cross Origin Request - Technical

Origin header in the request

```
GET /html5/cor.php HTTP/1.1
Host: victim.sro.co.il
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://attacker.sro.co.il/html5/cor.php
Origin: http://attacker.sro.co.il
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/534.30 (KHTM)
Chrome/12.0.742.100 Safari/534.30
Accept: */*
```

Origin header in the response

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2011 11:44:58 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.13
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 1203
<html>
```



Cross Origin Request - Technical

 Browser will send cookies along with the request, only if the request is set to send "credentials":

```
cor.open('GET', url);
cor.withCredentials = "true";
cor.send();
```

- Server answers with the header:
 Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
- If server doesn't answer the credentials header (or answers false), the page will not load.
- Access-Control-Allow-Origin can't be * if credentials are marked as true.



Cross Origin Policy - Attacks

Scanning the internal network

http://localhost:81/html5/COR/cor.php https://www.andlabs.org/tools/jsrecon.html

- Accessing internal websites
- Fast DDoS by POST method http://localhost:81/html5/COR/corDoS.php
- Reverse CORS requests



Cross Document Messaging - Attacks

- Demo
 - http://c0-m0.victim-site.com/html5/postMessage/main.htm

- Attacks
 - XSS
 - CSRF
 - Information disclosure



Clickjacking

- CSS3:
 - var e = document.getElementByld('iframe').style;
 - e.ffilter = 'alpha(opacity=0.5)';
 - e.mag.opacity = 0.5;
- Demo lolcat generator:
 - http://localhost:81/html5/click_jacking2/lolcat.php

http://c0-m0.victim-site.com/php/clickjacking/



Clickjacking

The old protection (Frame-Busting) script:

```
<script>
if(top.location != self.location)
  top.location = self.location;
</script>
```

Demo:

http://localhost:81/html5/sandbox/open_iframe.php



Clickjacking - Sandbox

HTML:

```
<iframe sandbox="" src="" ></iframe>
```

Options:

- allow-same-origin
- allow-top-navigation
- allow-forms
- allow-scripts

Demo:

http://localhost:81/html5/sandbox/sandbox_iframe.php



Web Socket

- http://slides.html5rocks.com/#web-sockets
- http://html5demos.com/web-socket
- https://www.andlabs.org/tools/ravan.html
- https://www.andlabs.org/tools/jsrecon.html



Web Workers

main.js:

```
var worker = new Worker('task.js');
worker.onmessage = function(event) { alert(event.data); };
worker.postMessage('data');
```

task.js:

```
self.onmessage = function(event) {
  self.postMessage("recv'd: " + event.data);
};
```

Test:

- https://www.andlabs.org/tools/jsrecon.html
- http://localhost:81/html5/COR/scanner/



Geolocation



GEOLOCATION API SUPPORT





Geolocation - Risk

- User Tracking
 - House burglars know when to strike.
 - The anonymity of users could be broken.



Geolocation Risks – Mitigations

 User needs to accept tracking for any site.

- Opt-In
 - Google Chrome: Allow Del

Accept once





Geolocation Risks - Private mode

• E9: Allow once ×

 Google Chrome & FF5 Remember the accept of location sharing!

Google Developer:

I'm tending towards WontFix.

https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=87387



New exploitation for old attacks

- Vulnerability pharse:
 <input type="text" value="-->Injecting here" />
- Before HTML5:"onmouseover="alert(0)
- With HTML5:" onfocus="alert(0)" autofocus= "
- Demo
 http://localhost:81/html5/new_exploits/xss.php



Summary

- HTML5 adds features that allow new browser capabilities.
- In this presentation we have demonstrated innovative ways for attackers to exploit & utilize these capabilities for malicious purposes.
- Have fun playing & hacking with HTML5!



Questions?



Thank you!

Contact: Israel@AppSec-Labs.com

